Evangelicals and Cultural Engagement:
An Assessment of the Past 100 Years

Scott D. Noble

Scott D. Noble is an assistant editor of Decision magazine, a publication of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.

Since the mid-1970s, evangelicals have traveled a path marred by potholes on their journey back toward cultural and political influence. Each success in terms of political victory or cultural ascendancy seemingly has been followed by an equally substantial defeat-both in relation to legislative issues and political clout.

This foray into politics and cultural engagement is not a recent endeavor for evangelicals. This heretofore largely untapped political constituency emerged from its cultural dormancy during the presidential election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 and has since struggled to determine its role, goals and strength amidst the American experiment.

Action to Dormancy to Action

Much of evangelical history in the 20th century has its roots in the modernist/fundamentalist debates of the early 1900s. The most significant and unfortunately the most memorable event during this period was the 1925 Scopes "Monkey" trial. Those who tried to stall or push back modernity's advances (particularly those advances that affected religious beliefs and the authority of the Christian worldview) became associated with religious fundamentalism. After the Scopes trial, this movement (those opposed to modernity's advances) was forced to reexamine its role in public life, especially the political environment.

For most of the 19th century, evangelicals actively engaged the nation's public life through involvement in politics, civic activities, and most notably through social service efforts. This public role was buttressed by a theology that supported the possibility of sanctifying the nation's public activities. Postmillennialism holds to the belief that through Christian action and missions, the world will become increasingly "Christianized." This theological position held sway among evangelicals throughout most of the 1800s and helped contribute to expansive social service and political activities, including the abolitionist movement.

By the early 1900s, theological debates-rooted in new developments in science, archaeology and literature-caused many Christians to reexamine their long-held positions. Longstanding beliefs and worldviews-set in place for hundreds of years-were now becoming suspect by an increasingly large segment of the population. The theological framework that gave meaning and direction to the world for evangelicals came under attack. The results of this attack dramatically altered the way evangelicals encountered their world.

After the Scopes trial, evangelicals were viewed as dubious among a growing segment of Americans. Fundamentalism, as the anti-modernist movement became known, was believed by many to support a belief system associated with rural America, as well as a belief system that was ultimately nonintellectual. As America increasingly modernized and more people moved to the cities, the fundamentalist worldview was thought by many to be outdated and no longer able to handle the difficult questions of modern life. For the next two decades (from the mid-1920s until after World War II), this movement, in a sense, became introverted and moved its emphasis from sanctifying the nation to its own internal matters.

Modernist beliefs that came to identify much of liberal and mainline Protestantism became dominant in most of the American religious scene from the mid-1920s until the late 1960s. For the most part, liberal and mainline Protestantism increasingly saw the views and beliefs of traditional Christianity as suspect; in many cases they eagerly adopted the modernist views that challenged Christianity. This willingness to adopt their views to the modernist proposals became a defining characteristic of liberal and mainline Protestantism. While anti-modernists turned inward and emphasized the construction of their own religious and social subcultures, mainline Protestantism became the dominant face of religious adherence in America. Many conservative Protestant leaders gained a loyal constituency during these years; however, most of their support was drawn from a relatively small and isolated segment of America. The increasingly modernized America was hearing the voice of mainline Protestantism and adopting its tenets.

In the mid-to-late 1940s, a rift emerged among anti-modernists. The more conservative leaders adhered strongly to the separatist doctrine that had been dominant for most of the previous 20 years, while another, younger group of leaders was poised to engage culture again and felt confident of their abilities to compete against liberal and secular values. With the emergence of leaders such as Billy Graham, Carl F. H. Henry and Harold Ockenga, evangelicals slowly moved out of their cultural and political dormancy. These neo-evangelicals, as they came to be called, led a movement that would soon feel confident enough to once again enter the nation's cultural and political minefields.

This path to cultural and political engagement was traveled slowly, however. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, evangelicals (and their more conservative cousins) concentrated on building, or in some cases rebuilding, a viable subculture. This subculture-including schools, Bible camps, publishing houses, seminaries and radio and television ministries-was largely responsible for passing on the faith to future generations and for preserving the faith during years of relative cultural dormancy.

Declining Membership for Mainline Denominations

During the 30 years from the mid-1920s until the mid-1950s, modernism as demonstrated in liberal and mainline denominations appeared to be winning the battle over the face of American Protestantism. However, while the general public saw religious modernism as an acceptable alternative to fundamentalism, those denominations that adopted modernism did not experience growth in their memberships. Mark Noll described membership in these denominations during the 1930s as a "religious depression" much like the economic depression of the same decade.

For most of the 1950s churches in general saw steady gains as the nation experienced a small church revival. But by the end of the 1950s, the long-term decline in mainline churches commenced again. Winthrop Hudson has noted that attendance leveled off for mainline denominations after 1957 and then declined. The reasons for this decline are varied and complex, but by the late 1960s, most mainline denominations had begun again their long-term decline; a decline that continued until the mid-1990s, when it slowly began to level off.

While membership in liberal denominations was stifled, more conservative denominations saw steady gains. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conservative denominations had experienced strong growth. From 1940 to 1980, the Assemblies of God grew from 199,000 to more than one million. The Christian and Missionary Alliance church grew from 23,000 members to 190,000 members. Church of God (TN), Seventh-Day Adventists, Church of the Nazarene, Salvation Army and others, also grew at a rapid rate. As well, many small, independent Bible churches and nondenominational churches grew at strong rates.

It was this development-the long-term decline of membership in liberal and mainline denominations and the concurrent growth in conservative denominations-that played a major role in the reemergence of evangelicals-in a prominent way-in the nation's public and political life. Kenneth Kanzter has attributed the resurgence of evangelicalism after World War II to the

. . . growth of scores of evangelical seminaries and graduate schools of theology, the renewed social conscience and sense of political responsibility among evangelicals … the religious bankruptcy of older modernism … and [the fact] that evangelical faith is a bulwark against moral and spiritual drift.

What did this mean for conservative denominations? Several things. First, after many decades in the backwoods of American public life, evangelicals began to realize that many people no longer castigated their values and beliefs. This gave them confidence to reengage the cultural and political scene, though exactly how was not yet determined. Second, demographically, members of conservative denominations no longer saw themselves as a small, isolated remnant. Their numerical strength would soon be realized and captivated by political opportunists. Third, this reemerged segment of the population presented a huge possibility for political advocacy.

By the 1970s, conservative denominations, through their extensive efforts of establishing and growing a relevant subculture, were poised to make inroads once again into public life.

Rise of the Religious Right

David Harrell, Jr. has connected the rise of the Religious Right with a group of conservative lobbyists who arrived in Washington D.C. during the 1970s. Harrell noted

The rise of the new religious Right was the result of an alliance of several major American evangelists with a group of lobbyists who had arrived in Washington in the early 1970s and welded an alliance that came to be known as the New Right.

But this new convergence needed an event or election to solidify their newfound alliance. This occurred during the presidential campaign in 1975 and 1976. Jimmy Carter's candidacy had two important consequences for this new political movement: First, the mobilization of this movement demonstrated to the political elites the existence of this new political constituency. Second, Carter helped to convince conservative Christians that politics was not a dirty business and that sincere Christians could and should be involved politically.

Once the media began to report that 60 million Americans were "born-again" Christians, the rest of society woke up to the existence of this untapped population. Fueled by media attention and marginal success (some people attributed Carter's election to this newfound political movement), the Religious Right began to experience growth as a movement. And with this growth came a reputation that oftentimes far outpaced the movement's actual strength and accomplishments.

While it is useful to discuss the circumstances that led evangelicals once again to engage the nation's political scene, a larger issue involves the motives and theological stipulations that give meaning and focus to evangelicals'political and cultural activity.

The Role of Christ in Culture

To determine the backdrop for engaging culture, we need to examine the theological motives and goals of the role of culture and faith. The eschatological doctrine of postmillennialism, which holds to an optimistic view of an increasingly Christianized culture, led evangelicals headlong into civic, social and political activities in the 1800s. While postmillennialism was not the only eschatological doctrine accepted among evangelicals during this time, it appears to have been the dominant view. The belief that culture would increasingly become Christianized through continued work, be it missionary activity, social work, political advocacy, etc., infused evangelicals with a strong zeal for this type of work and the eventual success of their toil. When adherence to postmillennialism began to wane in the late 1800s and particularly in the early 1900s, this coupled with the modernist debate, caused evangelicals to reexamine their view of culture.

Instead of a "Christ transforming culture" motif, many evangelicals began to see "Christ against culture" as a more relevant motif. No longer was culture seen as ultimately redeemable for the cause of Christ; culture became viewed as evil, dirty, and representative of that which is opposed to Christ. Now, obviously, certain aspects of culture no doubt enjoin things that are harmful and even diametrically opposed to Christian beliefs, but could so much change within such a short period of time?

Now, let's look ahead to the 1970s and 1980s-the decades when the Religious Right emerged on the political scene. Through an increasing number of people in the pews at conservative churches and through the perceived untapped political strength of conservatives, those who had previously opposed cultural and political engagement with the mainstream culture began to promote the idea of engagement. Fundamentalist, evangelical and Pentecostal leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Cal Thomas and Pat Robertson began to embrace political engagement in a manner and to an extent unseen in these circles in more than half a century.

Had the evangelical coalition really come of age? Had the attitude of separatism eroded to such a degree that cultural and political involvement was now seen as ordained by God? And, most important, is this new engagement strategy effective and theologically astute? Many events converged to cause this reversal of sorts among the coalition of anti-modernists. The significant issue, however, is the theological nature of this approach.

As the support for postmillennialism began to slowly subside in the late 1800s, the eschatological doctrine of premillennialism began to gain widespread support. Premillennialism holds to the belief that the world is fundamentally evil-worldwide conditions will only worsen until the second coming of Christ. As worldwide conditions, such as constant war (particularly World War I), entrenched poverty and political corruption, continued to prevail or became worse, many people saw postmillennialism as an unworkable doctrine, and it eventually became associated with Social Gospel adherents. Premillennialism, on the other hand, slowly gained adherents among fundamentalists and evangelicals in the latter part of the 19th century and into the early part of the 20th century. One of the main workings of premillennialism is its more pessimistic view of human nature and societal conditions. This view held no hope for the continued improvement of society and human nature; and as a result, adherents to premillennialism viewed the world in such a way that conditions would only worsen until Christ returns. Premillennialism was solidly entrenched among a large majority of evangelicals and fundamentalists by the early 1900s and has since remained the predominant eschatological view among evangelicals.

The newfound cultural and political involvement of the 1970s did not arise out of a renewal or reform of theological attitudes on engagement, however. This coalition did not believe-in any large numbers-that their new efforts would result in a "Christianizing of the culture." The theological pessimism of this movement regarding cultural and societal progress was juxtaposed with their hopes of reforming the moral and ethical nature of society through political and cultural involvement. This bifurcated approach to engagement has proved wanting in several respects. First, while adhering to a view of social and political pessimism, those who now supported renewed political and cultural involvement failed to tie their actions to any hope of success-be it social, political, environmental or theological. If the world is to become increasingly hopeless until Christ returns, then why does involvement make any real difference? Second, this view fails to embrace the hope of what Christ's love and sacrifice can do to transform culture. Finally, without a fundamental theological underpinning of some type of "success" in engagement, opponents can argue that evangelicals' renewed political and cultural actions are predicated upon a lust for power and influence.

Throughout the past 30 years the notion of transforming culture for redemptive purposes never became a dominant issue. Rather, the movement to reenter the political and cultural fray of the nation seemingly was based upon a notion of "taking back" what was lost in past generations or striving for moral and ethical agendas long since abandoned. Millions in this coalition of evangelicals perceived the nation as drifting morally and legislatively. Supreme Court rulings on abortion and school prayer, coupled with new legislative initiatives in numerous states regarding no-fault divorce laws, among a variety of other local and state issues, presented evangelical political leaders with kindling to ignite a political firestorm-witnessed by countless campaigns to alert and scare evangelicals into action with news that the country is hopelessly drifting morally, ethically, and politically.

As a result, this new engagement by evangelicals into the political and cultural environments was precipitated mainly by political motives and not by theological persuasion. Political engagement has become a means to an end-but which "end" remains the question.

The strategies of the past century regarding cultural and political engagement seem incomplete. Neither strategy-separatism or political engagement-has proved a successful policy in terms of redemptive purposes. For evangelicals intent upon bringing the message of the transforming power of Christ to a hurting world, the new millennium will present us with a myriad of choices and agendas. How can we bring Christ's message of hope and renewal to a hurting world-culturally, socially, politically, environmentally and theologically? Our agenda must be rooted in Christ's ultimate hope and victory, not in marginal and fleeting political and social victories. What we base our actions upon will ultimately determine the focus and success of our efforts.