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Oink
Martin Harris
Martin Harris is an architect and
former farmer.
For reasons I’ve never fully understood, the pig is the symbol of
greed. Maybe so, but I’ve known pigs, and Jeffrey Immelt is no pig. He
is, however, the current Chairman and CEO of General Electric, in which
role he managed to secure for himself an annual salary and bonus of $6.9
million for last year. Not that GE and its shareholders (of which I’m
one: a little full disclosure there) have done quite as well: the stock is
down from the high 50s to the low 20s and earnings are growing a lot
slower these days than they were in the heady years of his predecessor,
John Welch, who also pulled down about $7 mil per year. At least Welch
created added value for others in the GE “family.” About Immelt’s
remarkably successful pursuit of self-enrichment while employees were laid
off, pension agreements were “adjusted,” and stockholders took losses,
it’s hard to say much besides “oink .”
At least Immelt’s behavior (and that of his complicitous Board
members, who rubber-stamped his porcine monetary appetites) wasn’t as
flagrant as that of his fellow oinkers at the above enterprises, all of
whom made off with more than a rational old Yankee would probably even
want. But it was flagrant enough to raise my populist hackles, because
I’ve studied this nation’s history enough to see a repetitive pattern:
when skillful (and ethically challenged) three-piece-suit folks game our
free-enterprise system to their own excessive advantage, it makes a lot of
our normally pro-free-enterprise friends and neighbors yearn for a lot
more government regulation. The fairly crass behavior of the Federalists
brought about the Jacksonian Democrats; the late 19th century robber
barons led to the progressive reaction; the roaring twenties preceded the
near-socialism of the Roosevelt years; and now the
peasants-with-pitchforks (Pat Buchanan’s phrase, not mine) are being
urged by leftist rhetoricians to vote for enlarged government control of
business, as a punitive clampdown to prevent future Immelt behavior, or
worse, in American executive suites.
The original populists, a century ago, did just that and for the
same reasons: misbehavior in the executive suites. Most of their
regulatory desires became reality, from the Interstate Commerce Commission
(recently disbanded, remarkably) to commodity price management and a
sub-treasury concept that emerged into reality as the Federal Reserve
system in 1913. Other items on their wish list, like government takeover
and ownership of the railroads (it was called nationalization in England,
when it was tried there during socialist dominance) didn’t.
Most of the populist political platform involved an enlargement of
government, and most of it hasn’t worked very well. For example,
there’s been far more deterioration of the value of the national
currency—inflation—during the last 90 years of the Federal Reserve’s
“management” of such matters (94 percent loss of value) than during
the preceding 124 years, 1789 to 1913 (11 percent loss) when there was no
Fed. In 2002, it would have taken $18.08 to buy what $1 would have bought
in 1913; it would have taken $1.12, in 1913 to buy what $1 would have
bought in 1789.
As a result, the populists have become identified as just another
bunch of leftists out to aggrandize government and get themselves jobs and
power in it. The Wall Street Journal, typically, uses the label of
“populist” as something of a pejorative. But there were conservative
populists as well, advocates for private enterprise and property rights,
private ownership of farms and businesses and a minimum amount of
government intrusion. And while they’ve been pretty well forgotten by
the academic historians, most of whom, their voting patterns indicate,
have a somewhat gentrified-leftist view of economic issues, the one-time
presence of the conservatives comes out in the footnotes to history.
Consider, for example, Kansas newspaper publisher Mary Lease, who urged
farmers to raise less corn and more hell. As I read it, a century later,
that wasn’t a plea for a new government program to support grain prices;
it was a harangue for farmers themselves to manage crop quantities and
market them aggressively.
History is written by the side that wins, Vladimir Lenin is
supposed to have said, and certainly the conservative side of populism has
been edited out of the history books, if not the footnotes. There’s been
a lot of editing of ag history over the years; I’m reminded of the op-ed
page of American Agriculturist, which used to declare with great
certainty that there had never been a successful milk strike, and,
therefore, it was an idea not worth trying. There will be more such
revisionist history in the future, no doubt, as people jockeying for jobs
and power will make the argument, as former UVM Agronomist Win Way once
did, that agriculture never was, never will be and never should be,
anything other than a government-run public service, with themselves, of
course, in charge. In the present dire straits of the dairy industry,
particularly in the Northeast, look for that sort of leftist-populist
sentiment in increasing decibels as one sort of new “dairy compact”
after another is proposed. Unfortunately, there’s no Mary Lease around
these days to present, as the NFO’s Kenton Bailey once did, not too many
years ago, the conservative populist argument with equal verve.
Here’s the difference: in William Jennings Bryan’s day, farmers
were equal in numbers (and voting power) to the urban population; now,
they’re less than 2 percent of the whole. That’s why almost the entire
populist platform was taken up by one or both of the major parties, then,
and why it couldn’t happen now. The USDA’s Yearbooks of Agriculture
illustrate the shift: when farmers were a dominant political force, the
Yearbooks spoke of seeking greater farm prosperity; since 1920 (the Census
which first reported urban dominance) the Yearbooks have spoken of
abundant, healthful, cheap food for consumers. The Washington designers of
a new “dairy compact” will be interested in just enough price
enhancement to prevent milk shortages through farmers quitting, not in
farm “prosperity” through parity with urban earnings, for that would
mean—horrors—an increase in the consumer price of food.
And that, in turn, is why the oinkers of the recent market bubble
shouldn’t be used as examples of a problem only more government can
cure; in fact, the market itself has punished these companies and their
executive suites quite well and reminded people that what is unethical and
illegal isn’t usually profitable for long. The parallel lesson:
government should be more concerned about pursuing its legitimate
regulatory role (fraud prevention, in these cases) before it fantasizes
about taking over whole new swaths of the private sector.
As for extending the command economy notion into agriculture
because of current commodity prices, ask yourself whether the Mary Lease
solution isn’t better than the Win Way solution. After all, lots of
governments have tried to “manage” agriculture, without noticeable
success; whereas the Mary Lease solution has worked on those infrequent
occasions when it was actually tried: yes, there were successful milk
strikes, as one can read in the history of what used to be called
Dairyman’s League. Supplier “job actions” work in every other sector
of this economy when prudently used. I would respectfully suggest that
farmers read up on all this history as a counterweight to the
misinformation they’re so often fed by folks who have their own best
interests, and not the industry’s, as top priority.
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