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Durantyism: Journalism’s Bubonic
Plague
Arnold Beichman
Arnold Beichman, author of
Anti-American Myths: Their Causes and Consequences, is a Hoover
Institution Research Fellow.
I begin with the following proposition:
Probably the greatest triumph in public relations in all recorded
history was the elevation in the democratic West of the Soviet Union in
its 74-year-existence to a symbol of moral righteousness and a country
beyond criticism.
[i]
This triumph was all the more notable because from Day One
of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin’s system, to quote Robert Conquest,
“had as one of its main characteristics falsification on an enormous
scale.”
[ii]
This success was manifest above all in Western journalism and in
many universities. In journalism this triumph was to be found in the
attitude of some foreign correspondents and in how they covered the news
from Moscow and how their editors let them get away with sophistries
that a small town weekly would have deemed impermissible. There was
Walter Duranty of the New York Times and others like him who
concealed the truth of what is today recognized as having been one of
the most inhuman dictatorships of modern times, exceeding even Nazi
Germany in its barbarities. There is no secret in later years about the warped coverage about the Soviet Union. Here are the words of another New York Times correspondent, Max Frankel, who after years in Moscow wrote:
For
the “greatest story in the world” is also the greatest secret in the
world. And the lone correspondent is a poor match for a giant,
totalitarian government. The story is only rarely to be had on the
scene. The scholars will have to dig out what really happened.
[iii]
“What
really happened”! In other words what Western correspondents,
including Frankel himself, had been reporting about the Soviet Union to
democratic publics over the years was either untrue, half-true or
meaningless.
[iv]
I begin with a definition of “Durantyism,” a neologism which
embodies a concept. It refers to reportage about the Soviet Union (and
about other socialist dictatorships right up to and including the
Sandinista Nicaragua) in which the journalist lied deliberately or was
taken in by Soviet disinformation, or else became a victim of a built-in
censorship.
[v]
This lying was made legitimate because it was done on behalf of a
supposedly higher truth.
[vi]
A Duranty journalist need not have been a Communist to have
committed the lie of omission if not commission. For example, here is
the late Edward Crankshaw, a recognized expert on Soviet affairs, who
stated baldly in the London Observer:
Further
[the Russians] know very well that, in a number of cases, this newspaper
and others deliberately withheld news of Soviet acts of injustice,
sometimes for months, in the hope that private representations behind
the scenes might secure relief for the victims without loss of face for
the Soviet government.
[vii]
Durantyism didn’t begin with
Walter Duranty’s coverage of the former Soviet Union, which a New
York Times editorial note in 1990 described as “some of the worst
reporting to appear in this newspaper.”
[viii]
Looking at it retrospectively, one can say that Durantyism
began even before Duranty. It began with the Bolshevik revolution and
continued until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
[ix]
In 1920, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, later editor of the New
York Times editorial page, published a long article in the New
Republic called “A Test of the News.” The pamphlet revealed that
on 91 occasions the Times between Nov. 1917 and Nov. 1919
reported from Riga, Latvia that the Bolshevik regime had fallen or was
about to fall; among these occasions: 14
times — Bolshevik regime fallen or about to fall; 4
times — Lenin and Trotsky were reported as preparing to flee; 3
times — they had already fled; 2
times — Lenin reported retiring; 3
times — Lenin thrown into prison; 1
time — Lenin reported killed.
[x]
Not only were these stories untrue but there is every possibility
that these stories were an early example of Leninist disinformation. The
foreign correspondents in Riga were fed these stories so as to prevent a
possible Allied invasion, particularly by the British. If the Bolshevik
regime was so weak as reported by the Times and other newspapers,
why invade? A policy of wait-and-see might be the way to strangle the
infant in its cradle, to use Winston Churchill’s metaphor at the time.
[xi]
In my opinion, the 74 years during which the Bolsheviks ruled
were the dark ages of democratic journalism for which the world paid
heavily. Had the truth been forthcoming in the daily press, the
magazines, radio and latterly television, the Kremlin might never have
conquered half of Europe and turned sectors of the Western half into
silent or enthusiastic allies. As late as 1986, Stuart H. Loory, onetime
Moscow CNN bureau chief, in a letter to the Wall Street Journal
(February 3, 1986) wrote:
I
can say without reservation that if the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union were to submit itself to the kind of free elections held in South
Vietnam in the 1960s or El Salvador in the 1980s, it would win an
overwhelming mandate. . . . Except for small pockets of resistance to
the Communist regime, the people have been truly converted in the past
68 years.
In his book about the Cold War, Martin Walker, then Washington
correspondent of the British daily the Guardian, and earlier its
Moscow correspondent, wrote:
The
similarities between Moscow in the early 1980s and Washington in the
early 1990s became eerily acute to one who had lived through both. The
contrast between the former Soviet Union’s release of its prisoners
and the way that the USA had over one million of its citizens
incarcerated, summoned the bizarre, dismaying thought of an American
Gulag.
[xii]
Reading this passage brought up this memory: In 1949, David
Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Russian émigré social democrats, began
publishing articles and finally a book on forced labor in the Soviet
Union. During a visit to the Long Island home of a New York Times
correspondent covering the United Nations I met the then Times Moscow
correspondent. I told them about the Dallin-Nicolaevsky revelations and
the map the authors had prepared showing where the concentration camps
were located. Both correspondents waved me away with the smug assurance
that you shouldn’t take émigré propaganda seriously. Of course, the
slave labor story was fully revealed by a UN investigation a few years
later and documented by Robert Conquest in The Great Terror,
later by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago and most
recently by Ann Applebaum’s Gulag based on post-Soviet archives.
With the accession, following the death of Leonid Brezhnev, of
Yuri V. Andropov as the ruling strongman of the Soviet Union, Western
press credulity became scandalous. This was the high tide of Durantyism.
Andropov, known in Hungary as the Butcher of Budapest for his infamous
role during the 1956 Hungarian uprising and a long-time chief of the
KGB, instantly became the beneficiary of a disinformation campaign which
the American press lapped up with squeals of delight. Andropov was a “bibliophile,”
a “connoisseur of modern art,” who enjoyed American novels. The
ineffable Washington Post described Andropov as a
man
.
. . fond of cynical political jokes with an anti-regime twist . . .
collects abstract art, likes jazz and Gypsy music [and] has a record of
stepping out of his high party official’s cocoon to contact
dissidents. He
also swam, played tennis, danced the tango gracefully. Even the Wall
Street Journal news pages fell for this disinformation campaign.
Andropov, they reported, “likes Glenn Miller records, good scotch
whiskey, Oriental rugs, American books.” The New York Times and
Time magazine also fell in line which included a revelation that
Andropov “had a strange attraction for Western culture.”
[xiii]
It will be remembered that it was during the Andropov reign
that the KAL 007 was shot down. Durantyism never dies. The academic
version of Durantyism now reigns in the history departments of American
colleges and universities. (For a fully documented report of this
scandal see the recently published exposé by Harvey Klehr and John Earl
Haynes, In Denial).
*
* * * *
Part of the responsibility for the Great Lie era in the
journalism from Moscow lies with the academy. One of the great
intellectual failures of the century has been the failure by
distinguished academics—economists, political scientists, historians,
philosophers, sociologists many of them teachers at prestigeous
universities—to apply the standards of truth to their research into
the Soviet Union and Communism itself.
As a result of these falsehoods camouflaged as “research,” a
fictitious Soviet Union and an equally fictitious People’s Republic of
China as utopias-in-being were created for Western policy makers. The
relationship between the lies of the academy and the extermination of
millions of people within Soviet borders, in Eastern Europe, in China
and Southeast Asia may be casual or coincidental but there is no
question that Communist totalitarianism benefited from at least fifty
years of academic indulgence and willful credulity. As Lionel Trilling
once wrote:
This
is the great vice of academicism, that it is concerned with ideas rather
than with thinking and nowadays the errors of academicism do not stay in
the academy; they make their way into the world and what begins as a
failure of perception among intellectual specialists finds its
fulfillment in policy and action.
There are well-known academic Sovietologists whose scholarly
findings published as books or in academic journals, or in their public
lectures, were no more objective than editorials in the Soviet press. A
towering edifice of untruth about Communism and its two avatars—the
USSR and Communist China—was built up by the Sovietology “left”
(and later by the Sinology “left”) since the end of World War II.
Paul Craig Roberts and Karen La Follette in their important book,
Meltdown, have described these pro-Soviet and pro-Mao academics
as
.
. . disillusioned with their own countries, [who] dropped standards of
professional objectivity in their portrayal of the Soviet regime. An
indurated academic consensus emerged that Sovietologists, whatever their
sub-discipline, ought to avoid critical evaluations of Marxism-Leninism,
the command economy, Communism or Stalinism. Use of the word “totalitarian”
to describe the USSR or China was regarded as “red-baiting,” a most
heinous offense in academe or, at best, unscholarly behavior.
Never before have so many academics been proven by events and by
internal Soviet revelations to have been so abysmally wrong in virtually
everything they wrote about the Soviet Union or Marxism-Leninism. Few
people are aware of what the majority of these apologist Sovietologists,
particularly in the United States, were writing and teaching about the
Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism when Stalin was at the apogee of his
appalling power.
There were Western academic specialists in Soviet studies who
argued that the search for objective truth should be abetted by a
charitable “understanding” of the ideology called Marxism-Leninism,
and that however pernicious in practice, Marxism-Leninism and its
practitioners deserved the benefit of doubt.
The intellectual fiasco of the Sovietology “left,” who
camouflaged their ideology with the robes of academicism, should not be
forgotten. Present and future generations should see how the Great Hoax
was perpetrated.
[xiv]
*
* * * *
To understand how the Great Lie era in American journalism and
American intellectualdom occurred I suggest a reading of Eugene Lyons’s
book, Assignment in Utopia, especially chapter 6, “To Tell or
Not to Tell” and Chapter 15, “The Press Corps Conceals a Famine.”
[xv]
Lyons had in his early years in Moscow been a self-confessed
pro-Soviet partisan. Later he realized what had happened to him. As he
writes:
Exaggerated
faith in the Soviet experiment had become the intellectual fashion. The
more openly the Stalin regime moved away from socialism, the more
ardently these latter-day Communists championed the “socialist
fatherland.” Or
as he focused more directly on journalism’s deformation
professionelle:
Whether
in Moscow or Berlin, Tokyo or Rome, all the temptations for the
practicing foreign reporter are in the direction of conformity. It is
more comfortable and in the long run more profitable to soft-pedal a
dispatch for readers thousands of miles away than to face an irate
censor and closed official doors (page 582). * * * * *
There were correspondents who tried to tell the truth and even
had a temporary success. I refer to Malcolm Muggeridge who described
Duranty as “the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in fifty
years of journalism.” William L. Shirer, however, described him as “the
greatest of foreign correspondents to cover Moscow.”
[xvi]
There was also a witty cynic, A. T. Cholerton, correspondent
of the London News-Telegraph in the 1930s. He was accompanying a
group of western lawyers who were being shown the courtrooms in which
the show trials of the Old Bolsheviks had been staged. “But are their
confessions true?” they asked. One inquirer earnestly persisted.
Before the Intourist guide could reply. Cholerton interjected: “In
Russia, everything is true except the facts.”
[xvii]
Ω AppendixTo appreciate the meaning of Durantyism I have collected a few extracts from his New York Times dispatches:
There
is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is
widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition, (March 31,
1933), page 13.
Enemies
and foreign critics can say what they please. Weaklings and despondents
at home may groan under the burden, but the youth and strength of the
Russian people is essentially at one with the Kremlin’s program,
believes it worthwhile and supports it, however hard be the sledding,
(December 9, 1932), page 6.
You
can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs, (May 14, 1933), page 18.
And from Eugene Lyons’s Assignment in Utopia: Duranty
told him and Anne O’Hare McCormick, a New York Times foreign
affairs columnist, the ghastly story about the famine. “But, Walter,
you don’t mean that literally?” Mrs. McCormic, exclaimed. “Hell, I
don’t. . . . I’m being conservative,” he replied, adding his
famous truism, “But they’re only Russians,” (page 580).
[i]
As
Jean-Paul Sartre put it, “Russia is not comparable to other
countries. It is only permissible to judge Russia when one has
accepted its undertaking, and then only in the name of that
undertaking.” Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” Situations
(London: Hamish Hamilton 1965), page 266. He also wrote: “To keep
hope alive one must, in spite of all mistakes, horrors, and crimes,
recognize the obvious superiority of the socialist camp.” Quoted in
Francois Bondy, “Jean-Paul Sartre, “ The New Left
, ed. Maurice Cranston (Liberty Press, 1971), page 52. H. G. Wells,
Visiting Russia after the revolution, was one of the earliest Soviet
apologists: “Apart from individual atrocities, [the Soviet Union]
did on the
whole kill for a reason and to an end.” Quoted in George Watson, Politics
and Literature in Modern Britain (Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), page 49. An even more ghastly
sentiment was expressed by G. D. H. Cole: “Much better to be ruled
by Stalin than by a pack of half-witted and half-hearted Social
Democrats.” Ibid. page 67. And then there is the unforgettable statement by David
Rockefeller who spent 10 days in China which he said was like seeing
New York City “in less than one-and-a-half minutes.” Nevertheless
he said that “one is impressed immediately by the sense of national
harmony.” He concluded that “the social experiment in China under
Chairman Mao’s leadership is one of the most important and
successful in human history. . . . Whatever the price of the Chinese
revolution, it has obviously succeeded” not only in economic terms
but also “in fostering high morale and community of purpose.” Op
Ed page, New York Times
(August 10 1973), quoted in Encounter,
April 1974, page 94. [ii] Speech by Robert Conquest, (July 7, 1992), page 2, mimeo. “History, production figures, census results were all faked. . . . The struggle against the Soviet monster was above all a fight for truth,” he said. [iv] Joseph Schumpeter “Selective information, if in itself correct, is an attempt to lie by speaking the truth.” Quoted in Freedom-at-Issue #53 November 12, 1979, page 36. [v] The London Observer reported “a subtle process of corruption, of which the [Moscow] correspondents themselves are often unaware.” It was referring to the self-censorship which correspondents in Moscow engaged in simply to survive, to get their cables out without inordinate delays. The Observer writer, Andrew Shonfield, said: “But avoiding risks means in effect thinking, from the moment you begin to write your piece, about the view of the man looking over your shoulder—and when there is a chance that he may not like some phrase which is not absolutely essential to the argument, you cut it out.” Shonfield said that Soviet pressure and censorship wouldn’t matter “so much if there were full and unequivocal support for the journalist from his newspaper agency back home in resisting these ambiguous pressures on him. But unfortunately his employers are usually concerned chiefly to hold the privilege of maintaining their staff and office inside Russia. They feel it is best to avoid a fuss.” Douglass Cater in his book, The Fourth Branch of Government wrote: “One wire-service reporter remarked that his agency cared more about preserving its Moscow dateline than the accuracy of his dispatches. He had been instructed quite bluntly that his first responsibility is to maintain his accreditation. It is scarcely an incentive for courageous journalism.” Beichman, op. cit. page 91. [vi] Walter Duranty, the Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times Moscow correspondent at the time of the Stalin-made Russian famine was asked what he was going to write. Duranty replied: “Nothing. What are a few million dead Russians in a situation like this? Quite unimportant. This is just an incident in the sweeping historical changes here. I think the entire matter is exaggerated.” An American Engineer in Stalin’s Russia: The Memoirs of Zara Witkin, 1932-1934, University of California Press. Also see S. J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times Man in Moscow (Oxford University Press, 1990). [vii] London Observer (Feb. 17, 1963). [viii] The New York Times reporting from Moscow didn’t improve after Walter Duranty’s departure. His successor, Harold Denny, once wrote that “most of us believe that beneath all the improbabilities if not falsehoods of the last [purge] trial there was a substratum of truth.” Harrison Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor, (Ballantine, 1980), page 465. [ix] When the Soviet Union accused the U.S. of introducing AIDS as part of its alleged biological warfare research, Dan Rather—March 30, 1987—played this report as news and offered no evidence other than the Soviet report. For a report on the KGB disinformation campaign to blame the U.S. for the AIDS epidemic see Roy Godson, Washington Post (January 25, 1987), “Outlook.” [x] Salisbury, ibid., page 461. [xi] For a detailed story of Soviet deception operations against possible counterrevolution by White Guard exiles and invasion from the West, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: the Inside Story, (Harper Collins 1990), pages 97-106, 110, 384, 386. [xii] The Cold War: a History, by Martin Walker. Holt & Co., 1994. Fashions in left-liberal culture don’t change much. Forty-five years earlier, the New Yorker then pointed to what it called the growth of “a group of American political prisoners [who] are being marched steadily, imperceptibly, toward the queer Siberia of our temperate zone.” (August 6, 1949). [xiii] Edward Jay Epstein, “The Andropov File: how a short, burly thug became a tall, dapper Chubby Checker fan,” New Republic (February 7, 1983), pages 18ff. One of the marvelous boners Epstein cited which nobody picked up was that the peddler of all these yarns about Andropov, one Vladimir Sakharov, said he had seen in Andropov’s apartment in 1964 Jacqueline Suzann’s novel Valley of the Dolls and in English yet. The novel wasn’t published until 1966.
[xiv]
For an
important examination about the Sovietology Left see “The Strange
Death of Soviet Communism: An Autopsy,” The National Interest
No. 31 (Spring 1993). [xv] Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, (Harcourt Brace, 1937), pages 572 and 624. [xvi] S. J. Taylor, op. cit., page 2. [xvii] Malcolm Muggeridge: A Life, by Ian Hunter. (Thomas Nelson, 1980), page 79 .
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